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Note
CAPERTON v. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.: SOMETHING IS ROTTEN
IN THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA—A COMMONLAW APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION
BENJAMIN A. LEVIN*
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,1 the Supreme Court of the
United States considered when the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a judge to disqualify himself from hearing a case because one of the parties contributed to his judicial
campaign.2 Holding that there was an unconstitutionally high
probability of bias,3 the Court remanded the case for rehearing without the now-disqualified judge.4 In so holding, the Court articulated a
disqualification jurisprudence that failed to account for the general
development of its due process jurisprudence.5 Although a correct
application of precedent would have allowed the Court to reach the
same result,6 the Due Process Clause did not require such a disposition.7 Instead, the Court should have affirmed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, not because the judge
properly remained on the case, but because constitutional principles
should not have been extended to the judge’s decision.8
Copyright  2010 by Benjamin A. Levin.
* Many thanks are due to Professors William Reynolds and Donald Gifford of the
University of Maryland School of Law, as well as Justice Larry Starcher and Dean John
Fisher II of the West Virginia University College of Law. I am grateful for their willingness
to help, and my thought process owes much to their guidance. I would also like to thank
Professors David Gray and Robert Condlin for their patience and mentorship; they have
guided me in more ways than can be set to paper. Thanks are also due to Maggie Grace
and Maryland Law Review editors, particularly Rachel Witriol, Rachel Shapiro, Kali Enyeart,
Elise Gelinas, and Rajni Sekhri for their helpful edits. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to
Shakespeare for suggesting such a pithy title phrase.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
2. Id. at 2256–57.
3. Id. at 2265.
4. Id. at 2267.
5. See infra Part IV.A–B.
6. See infra Part IV.C.1.
7. See infra Part IV.C.2.
8. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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THE CASE

In August 2002, a West Virginia jury found A.T. Massey Coal
Company, Inc. and its subsidiaries (“Massey”) liable for tortious interference with existing contractual relations, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment based on Massey’s actions while
negotiating to purchase a coal mine.9 The jury awarded $50,038,406
in compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiffs, Hugh M.
Caperton, Harman Development Corporation (“Harman Development”), and Harman Development’s subsidiaries (collectively
“Caperton”).10 Following the Circuit Court of Boone County’s denial
of Massey’s motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or
remittitur, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia.11
Before the appeal was considered, however, the State of West Virginia held its 2004 judicial elections.12 Don Blankenship, the chairman, chief executive officer, and president of Massey, supported
attorney Brent Benjamin’s challenge to supreme court of appeals incumbent Justice McGraw.13 Blankenship contributed the $1000 statutory maximum directly to Benjamin’s campaign, as well as
approximately $2.5 million to And For The Sake Of The Kids (“ASK”),
a political organization formed under Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code that supported Benjamin and opposed Justice McGraw.14
This comprised more than two-thirds of the total funds raised by
ASK.15 Blankenship also spent approximately $500,000 in independent expenditures to support Benjamin through such devices as direct
mailings and advertisements.16 In total, Blankenship spent more than
9. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 233 (W. Va. 2008). Harman
Mining Corporation (“Harman Mining”) and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. (“Sovereign”)
were two of the three subsidiaries through which their previous parent corporation owned
the Harman Mine, an underground coal mine in Buchanan County, Virginia, that produced high quality metallurgical coal. Id. at 230. In 1993, Caperton formed Harman Development Corporation and purchased Harman Mining, Sovereign, and the third
subsidiary in order to acquire the mine. Id. The trial judge found that Massey, another
coal supplier that had entered into negotiations to purchase the mine from Harman Development, id. at 231–32, “intentionally acted in utter disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights and ultimately destroyed Plaintiffs’ businesses because . . . the Defendants concluded it was in its
financial interest to do so,” Joint Appendix at 32a, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22).
10. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 229, 233.
11. Id. at 229.
12. The order appealed from was not issued by the circuit court until March 15, 2005.
Id.
13. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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all of Benjamin’s other supporters and three times more than Benjamin’s own committee.17 Benjamin won the election with over fifty
percent of the votes.18
Following Justice Benjamin’s election, Caperton moved to disqualify him from hearing Massey’s forthcoming petition for appeal19
and participating in any related proceedings, alleging a conflict
caused by Blankenship’s campaign involvement while he was party to
a pending case.20 Justice Benjamin denied the motion, and the court
ultimately granted review of the case.21
Despite finding that “Massey’s conduct warranted the type of
judgment rendered in this case,”22 the supreme court of appeals reversed the judgment, remanding the case and ordering the circuit
court to dismiss the case with prejudice.23 Caperton sought a rehearing, and both parties moved to disqualify three of the five justices who
had decided the appeal.24 Two of the justices, Justices Starcher and

17. Id.
18. See 2004 OFFICIAL ELECTION RETURNS OF WEST VIRGINIA (2005), http://www.sos.wv.
gov/elections/historyresource/Documents/allgeneral04.pdf (listing Benjamin’s total vote
count at 382,036 and McGraw’s at 334,301).
19. Caperton filed his motion after Massey indicated its intention to appeal but before
Massey actually filed the petition. Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 324a.
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia is entirely
discretionary. See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (“[An] appeal shall be allowed by the supreme court of appeals . . . only after the court . . . is satisfied that there probably is error in
the record, or that [the record] presents a point proper for the consideration of the
court.”). As there are no intermediate appellate courts in West Virginia, see W. VA. CODE
§ 58-5-1 (2005) (“A party to a civil action may appeal to the supreme court of appeals from
a final judgment of any circuit court or from an order of any circuit court constituting a
final judgment . . . .”), Massey’s appeal would necessarily be heard in the supreme court of
appeals—but only if the court granted review, see West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/Supreme.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2010) (“West Virginia is
one of only 11 states with a single appellate court . . . . The Court’s appellate jurisdiction is
entirely discretionary.”).
20. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2257. Caperton moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin under
the Due Process Clause and the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct. Id.
21. Id. at 2257–58.
22. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, slip op. at 13 (W. Va. Nov. 21, 2007).
23. Id. at 63. The supreme court of appeals explained that its decision was mandated
by a forum selection clause that required all actions to be brought in Buchanan County,
Virginia, and by principles of res judicata raised by Harman Mining and Sovereign’s earlier
contract suit against Massey’s subsidiary. Id. at 44–45, 63. For the specifics of the earlier
suit, see Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Harman Mining Corp., 568 S.E.2d 671 (Va. 2002).
24. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258. Caperton sought disqualification of Justice Benjamin
again, as well as Justice Maynard, who had vacationed with Blankenship while the case was
pending. Id. Massey sought disqualification of Justice Starcher, who had been a vocal
critic of Blankenship’s role in the 2004 elections. Id.

R
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Maynard, disqualified themselves, but Justice Benjamin did not.25
With Justice Benjamin acting as chief justice, the court granted
Caperton’s motion to rehear the case.26 Caperton moved to disqualify
Justice Benjamin for the third time, but Justice Benjamin refused to
withdraw.27 Ultimately, the supreme court of appeals vacated the
original opinion and again reversed the circuit court’s judgment.28
Approximately four months later, Justice Benjamin filed a concurring
opinion in which he defended the court’s decision and his refusal to
disqualify himself.29 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine when the Due Process Clause of the United States
Constitution requires judicial disqualification in the context of judicial elections.30
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Although the Court’s due process jurisprudence began as a historical inquiry, the Court has long understood the Due Process Clause
to embody basic rights, rather than fixed, technical practices.31 Accordingly, the Court’s disqualification jurisprudence, while derived
from strict common-law rules, has evolved out of the basic right to a
fair trial.32

25. Id. Although accepting that he should not have made the “intemperate remarks,”
Justice Starcher disqualified himself specifically to encourage Justice Benjamin’s disqualification. E-mail from Larry V. Starcher, Former Justice, Supreme Court of Appeals of W.
Va., to author (Nov. 16, 2009) (on file with the Maryland Law Review). In his Voluntary
Disqualification Order, he strongly urged Justice Benjamin to disqualify himself. See Voluntary Disqualification Order at 9, A.T. Massey Coal Co. v. Caperton, No. 33350 (W. Va.
Feb. 15, 2008), available at http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/press/caperton.pdf (“And I reiterate that unless another justice also steps aside in this case, my replacement on the Court
will be selected by the justice whose campaign was supported by something close to
$4,000,000 from monies that came from one side of the case.”).
26. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 229 (W. Va. 2008) (“This case
is presently before this Court on rehearing.”).
27. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2258.
28. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 229 & n.1.
29. Id. at 286–87, 291–93 (Benjamin, C.J., concurring). Justice Albright referenced
Justice Benjamin’s refusal to disqualify himself in his dissent on rehearing and suggested
that the disqualification motion raised due process issues that needed to be addressed. Id.
at 284 n.16 (Albright, J., dissenting).
30. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2256, 2262.
31. See infra Part II.A.
32. See infra Part II.B.
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A. The Court’s Due Process Jurisprudence Has Shifted from a Historical
Inquiry to a Flexible Test Based upon Fundamental Principles
of Liberty and Justice
The Court has long recognized that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment33 evades easy definition,34 but its understanding of and approach to the doctrine have changed from a historical inquiry to one that is flexible and principle-based.35 Over time,
the Court developed a balancing test, thus providing guidelines for
due process analysis,36 but it never rejected its earlier approaches.37
In short, the history of due process interpretation illustrates that the
Court has always eschewed “comprehensive definition[s],”38 preferring instead to define due process as a function of “ordered liberty”
and “a fair and enlightened system of justice.”39
1. The Court Shifted from a Historical Inquiry to a Principle-Based
Approach
The first known usage of the phrase “due process” was in an English statute enacted in 1354, which stated that “no Man . . . shall be
put out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without being brought in Answer by due
Process of the Law.”40 According to the influential English jurist Sir
Edward Coke, however, the concept of due process had been incorporated into the English document Magna Carta in 1215, which de33. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: “[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
34. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“‘[D]ue process,’ unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances.” (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,
895 (1961))); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898) (“This court has never attempted
to define with precision the words ‘due process of law’ . . . . It is sufficient to say that there
are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard . . . .”).
35. See infra Part II.A.1.
36. See infra Part II.A.2.
37. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 430 (1994) (“As this Court has stated
from its first due process cases, traditional practice provides a touchstone for [due process]
analysis.”).
38. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
39. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
40. 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.); see also Thomas H. Burrell, Justice Stephen Field’s Expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment: From the Safeguards of Federalism to a State of Judicial Hegemony,
43 GONZ. L. REV. 77, 141 n.325 (2007–2008) (noting the origin of the phrase “Due
Process”).
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clared that “[n]o freeman shall be taken or [and] imprisoned or
disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him
nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or
[and] by the law of the land.”41 Coke explained that the phrase “by
the law of the land” was synonymous with the phrase “due proces[s] of
law,” which in turn signified “due proces[s] of the common law.”42
It was Coke’s view of history—his equation of the words “due process of law” with “by the law of the land”—that the Supreme Court
adopted in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.43 when it
first considered the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.44 Recognizing that the Constitution “contains no
description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid,”45 the Court derived a two-part test for determining when the due
process requirement is met.46 First, the Court must examine the entire Constitution to ascertain whether there is a controlling provision.47 Absent such a provision, the Court “must look to those settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statue
[sic] law of England.”48
This strict historical approach did not last, however. Twenty-nine
years later, the Court expanded its understanding of the Due Process
Clause in Hurtado v. California49 when it allowed California to dilute
41. Magna Carta, c. 39 (1215), reprinted in WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 375 (2d ed. 1914) (second and third
alterations in original).
42. 2 EDWARDO COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (London, 1797).
This is an accepted, if controversial, interpretation of Coke. Compare 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *13 (12th ed. 1873) (“The words, by the law of the land, . . . are
understood to mean due process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and
lawful men . . . .”), with Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due
Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 277 (1975) (“When we peruse the commentary as
a whole, however, it becomes doubtful that Coke was simply equating ‘per legem terrae’
with ‘due process of law.’”). Ultimately, however, it makes no difference because the Supreme Court asserted a particular historical interpretation, which is all that matters in a
legal system that privileges precedent over historians’ accounts. See infra text accompanying note 44.
43. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
44. Id. at 276–77.
45. Id. at 276.
46. Id. at 276–77.
47. Id. at 277.
48. Id.
49. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). In Hurtado, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
language is “used in the same sense and with no greater extent” than the Fifth Amendment
language. Id. at 534–35; see also Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610
(1936) (“[T]he restraint imposed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
upon legislative power of the State is the same as that imposed by the corresponding provision of the Fifth Amendment upon the legislative power of the United States.”).

R
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the procedure required for criminal proceedings.50 Responding to
the appellant’s contention that the Due Process Clause has a “fixed,
definite, and technical meaning,”51 the Court explained that its holding in Murray’s Lessee stood only for the proposition that something
“must be taken to be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of
settled usage both in England and in this country,”52 not that due
process is limited to those processes with a historical pedigree.53 The
Court explained that freezing the definition of due process “would be
to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable
of progress or improvement.”54 Instead, the Court explained, “the
spirit of personal liberty and individual right” has been “developed by
a progressive growth and wise adaptation to new circumstances.”55 Accordingly, the Court held that the Due Process Clause allows a degree
of flexibility because it embodies “broad and general maxims of liberty and justice,” which “must be held to guarantee not particular
forms of procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life,
liberty, and property.”56
In Twining v. New Jersey,57 the Court followed its reasoning in
Hurtado and concluded that a legal process is essential to due process
if it derives from “a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which
inheres in the very idea of free government and is the inalienable
right of a citizen of such a government.”58 The Court cautioned,
though, that it must “not import into the discussion [its] own personal
views of what would be wise, just and fitting rules of government to be
adopted by a free people and confound them with constitutional limi50. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 538. Specifically, the California legislature dispensed with the
traditional requirement of indictment by grand jury for felony prosecutions. Id. at 520.
The Court applied a due process analysis despite its explanation that “appeals of murder,
which were prosecutions by private persons, were never regarded as contrary to Magna
Charta.” Id. at 526, 528.
51. Id. at 521.
52. Id. at 528.
53. Id. at 529.
54. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Court quoted approvingly from Thomas Cooley’s A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations: “The principles, then, upon which the process is based, are to determine whether it is ‘due process’ or not, and not any
considerations of mere form.” Id. at 527 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 356 (1868)). The Court also stated that “we should expect
that the new and various experiences of our own situation and system will mould and
shape it into new and not less useful forms.” Id. at 531.
55. Id. at 530.
56. Id. at 532.
57. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
58. Id. at 106.
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tations.”59 Accordingly, it found no support in precedent that due
process requires anything more than the court have jurisdiction and
the parties are accorded notice and an opportunity to be heard.60
The Court further emphasized the importance of these fundamental principles to its due process analysis in Moore v. Dempsey,61
where it held that kangaroo courts62 violate the Due Process Clause.63
Rather than engage in the historical inquiry suggested by Murray’s
Lessee and modified by Hurtado, the Court cited only one prior case—
doing so for the specific proposition that a mob’s actual interference
with the course of justice entails a denial of due process.64 Instead,
the Court reasoned as if from first principles and held that due process is denied if “the whole proceeding is a mask” and state courts
subsequently failed to correct this error.65
In contrast, the Court in Tumey v. Ohio66 explained that an analysis of due process requires a historical inquiry into the “settled usages
and modes of proceeding” that existed in English common and statutory law and that were later incorporated into American legal practice.67 Although it analyzed the Due Process Clause differently from
the Dempsey Court, the Tumey Court nonetheless based its holding in
the defendant’s basic right to an impartial judge.68 Justice Cardozo
expressed the underlying principle eloquently in Palko v. Connecticut,69
in which he referred to due process as that which is “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.”70 The test, therefore, according to Justice
59. Id. at 106–07. The Court went on to explain that its due process analysis only permits consideration of “those fundamental rights which are expressed in that provision,”
since the rights fundamental in citizenship are otherwise secured. Id. at 107. Thus, the
question is simply “whether the right is so fundamental in due process that a refusal of the
right is a denial of due process.” Id.
60. Id. at 110–11.
61. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
62. The term “kangaroo court” refers to “a sham legal proceeding in which a person’s
rights are totally disregarded and in which the result is a foregone conclusion.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 868 (6th ed. 1990).
63. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 90–91; see also Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646,
657 (K.B.) (“[F]orasmuch as the defendants have confessed in the Bar, that they have
imprisoned the plaintiff without cause, the plaintiff shall have judgment . . . .”).
64. Dempsey, 261 U.S. at 90–91.
65. Id. at 91.
66. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
67. Id. at 523.
68. Id. at 535.
69. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969).
70. Id. at 324–25. The precise context of this quote is with regard to substantive due
process, see id. (discussing “immunities” against the federal government that the Four-
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Cardozo, was whether a “fair and enlightened system of justice” could
not exist without the right or procedure in question.71
2. More Recently, the Court Has Developed a Balancing Test to
Guide Its Due Process Analysis
The Court never moved away from this principle-based approach
to the Due Process Clause, but as it dealt with a wider variety of cases,
the Court developed more specific guidelines for determining what
process is due. For example, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy,72 a cook alleged a violation of due process after she was summarily fired for failure to meet new security requirements.73 In resolving her claim, the Court articulated a balancing test for determining
the requirements of due process, which weighed the nature of the
government function at issue against the private interest affected by
the governmental action.74
The Court clarified this approach in Morrissey v. Brewer,75 a case in
which the Court considered the process due before a revocation of
parole.76 The first question, the Court explained, is whether procedural protections are due, a determination that “depends on the extent
to which an individual will be condemned to suffer grievous loss.”77
Once the requirement for process has been established, the Court
must then determine its scope, and it is that inquiry that entails the
situation-specific flexibility that the Court described in McElroy.78
teenth Amendment establishes as valid against the states), but Justice Cardozo’s elaboration transcends this distinction, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
71. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (discussing the rights to trial by jury and immunity from
prosecution except as a result of indictment). As the Court later clarified, the question is
really whether the procedure is necessary to our historically contingent “Anglo-American
regime of ordered liberty.” Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968); see also
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 n.12 (1977) (“[A]n approach grounded
in history imposes limits on the judiciary that are more meaningful than any based on the
abstract formula taken from Palko v. Connecticut . . . .”).
72. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
73. Id. at 887–89.
74. Id. at 895. The Court followed this approach in Bloom v. Illinois, in which it found
that, in serious contempt proceedings, “considerations of efficiency must give way to the
more fundamental interest of ensuring the even-handed exercise of judicial power.” 391
U.S. 194, 209 (1968). The Court thus balanced the need to further respect for judges and
courts against the individual’s interest in avoiding serious criminal punishment without
having been afforded fundamental procedural protections. Id. at 208.
75. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
76. Id. at 472.
77. Id. at 481 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. The Court explained it as follows:
To say that the concept of due process is flexible does not mean that judges are at
large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope once it

R
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The Court explained how to determine what specific process is
due in Mathews v. Eldridge.79 In Mathews, the Social Security Administration terminated the petitioner’s disability benefits without a pretermination hearing.80 Relying on the Morrissey Court’s assertion that
“due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands,”81 the Court articulated three levels
of analysis: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2)
the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest through current procedures and the comparative value of additional or different procedures; and (3) the government’s interest, which includes the function
of the contested process as well as any burdens entailed by heightened
procedural protections.82 The Court has thus translated the flexible
and imprecisely defined Due Process Clause into a usable legal principle, but due process analysis nonetheless remains flexible and rooted
in fundamental principles.83
B. The Court’s Judicial Disqualification Jurisprudence Has Developed
from a Strict Common-Law Approach to One Founded upon
Broader Principles of Fairness
The Court’s approach to judicial disqualification departs from its
procedural due process jurisprudence84 in that “[t]he due process
right to a competent and impartial tribunal is quite separate from the
right to any particular form of proceeding.”85 At its core, the Due
Process Clause has always required disqualification because of interest,86 but the finer points of the rules governing disqualification have
has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.
Id.
79. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
80. Id. at 323–25.
81. Id. at 334 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 481).
82. Id. at 335.
83. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (noting that “the Due Process
Clause, like its forebear in the Magna Carta, was ‘intended to secure the individual from
the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government’” (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 527 (1884))); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due
process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers
Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“The very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”).
84. See supra Part II.A.2.
85. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972).
86. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (“Every procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required
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never been as clearly demarcated.87 Tracking the development of the
Court’s due process jurisprudence, the Court’s disqualification jurisprudence shifted from a historical inquiry to an analysis based on fundamental principles.88
1. The Court Originally Engaged in Historical Inquiry to Decide
Disqualification Cases
Historically, the rules governing judicial disqualification derive
from the maxim that “no man shall be a judge in his own case.”89 As
such, the English court in Day v. Savadge90 denied the City of
London’s participation in cases affecting it, asserting that “even an Act
of Parliament, made against natural equity, as to make a man Judge in
his own case, is void in it self.”91 Similarly, in City of London v. Wood,92
the court explained that “it is against all laws that the same person
should be party and Judge in the same cause.”93 Between the Parishes of
Great Charte & Kennington94 illustrated the strictness of this rule when
the court disqualified a judge from hearing a case about a pauper
merely because the judge paid taxes in the parish from which the pauper in question had been removed.95
to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.”).
87. Compare Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (“[J]ustice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.”), with Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465 (1971) (distinguishing the case at hand from Offutt and noting that “not every attack on a judge . . .
disqualifies him from sitting”).
88. See infra Part II.B.1–2.
89. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 610 (1947). This is merely
one phrasing of a maxim that has deep historical roots. See Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77
Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.) (“aliquis non debet esse Judex in propria causa” [no man should be a
judge in his own cause] (author’s translation)); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 42 (James
Madison) (Terence Ball ed., 2003) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause;
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his
integrity.”). In Dr. Bonham’s Case, Coke went on to state that “one cannot be Judge and
attorney for any of the parties.” (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. He found problematic that
parties on one side of the case had acted as “judges, ministers, and parties; judges to give
sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and parties to have the moiety of the
forfeiture.” Id.
90. (1615) 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (K.B.).
91. Id. at 237.
92. (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (K.B.).
93. Id. at 1602. The court explained that a single person serving as both party and
judge is a “manifest contradiction.” Id.
94. (1743) 93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B.).
95. Id. at 1107–08. The court also noted that if there had been no other judges to hear
the case, the interested judge could have heard it so as “to prevent a failure of justice.” Id.
at 1108. This foreshadowed the modern doctrine of necessity, which holds that “a judge is
not disqualified to sit in a case if there is no other judge available to hear and decide the
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Yet it was only when the judge had an interest in the case that he
would be disqualified at common law.96 Thus, in Brookes v. Earl of Rivers,97 the court refused to disqualify a judge whom it determined had
no interest, even though the judge was brother-in-law to one of the
parties.98
The Supreme Court of the United States generally adopted these
common-law principles guiding judicial disqualification. One of the
first cases in which the Court dealt with the issue of judicial disqualification was Tumey v. Ohio.99 The statute at issue in Tumey allowed violators of the state’s Prohibition Act to be tried by the village mayor
without a jury.100 Pursuant to authority granted by the statute, the
Village Council of North College Hill passed an ordinance that disbursed to the mayor a portion of the fines collected under the statute,
but because the mayor was to be paid from the fines collected, he
would only be paid if he convicted the defendant.101 Explaining that
“questions of judicial qualification [need] not involve constitutional
validity,”102 the Court accepted as given the general rule that judges
are disqualified because of interest in a controversy, although it noted
that some cases raise subtle questions as to the requisite degree or
nature of the interest.103 Applying the historical inquiry described by
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,104 the Court explained that American courts adopted the English common-law rule
that judges who had even the slightest pecuniary interest in a controversy would be disqualified,105 although some courts and legislatures
case.” 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judges § 84 (2006); see also United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213–16
(1980) (adopting the doctrine explicitly).
96. William Blackstone explained the following:
By the laws of England also, in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might be
refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that judges or
justices cannot be challenged. For the law will not suppose a possibility of [bias]
or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and
whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (Oxford, Clarendon
Press 1768) (footnote call numbers omitted).
97. (1668) 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex.).
98. Id. The court explained that “favour shall not be presumed in a judge.” Id.
99. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
100. Id. at 516–17.
101. Id. at 517–20.
102. Id. at 523.
103. Id. at 522. One such case is when the judge’s sole interest derives from his status as
a taxpayer. Id. In this regard, the Court suggested that “the circumstance that there is no
judge not equally disqualified to act in such a case has been held to affect the question.”
Id.
104. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276–77 (1855); see supra text accompanying notes 43–48.
105. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 524–26, 528.
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eschewed a strict application of this rule because they found it to be
“inconvenient, impracticable and unnecessary.”106 The Court concluded that relaxation of the strict common-law rule “has not become
so embedded by custom” as to provide due process of law, except
when the judge’s interest “may be properly ignored as within the
maxim de minimis non curat lex.”107 Accordingly, it held that the Due
Process Clause requires judicial disqualification when the judge has a
“direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest.”108 The Court
stressed that, although “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy,
[and] remoteness of interest” are generally questions for legislative
discretion,109 due process would always be implicated (and denied) by
any procedure that “offer[s] a possible temptation to the average man
as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused.”110
The Tumey Court also offered an alternative ground for finding a
denial of due process. Due process is denied, it explained, when “an
official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial”;111 here, the mayor had
the partisan interest in raising public moneys because his responsibility for the financial condition of his village created a strong motive “to
help his village by conviction and a heavy fine.”112

106. Id. at 529. Such cases arose when the judge’s interest was “too slight to excite
prejudice against a defendant.” Id. at 530.
107. Id. at 531. In other words, “[t]he law does not concern itself about trifles.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
108. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523. The Court did not, however, decide whether due process
requires disqualification for lesser interests because it engaged in historical analysis specifically to determine whether a traditionally unacceptable procedure—paying a judge from
conviction fines—had become acceptable as a “settled usage[ ]” or “mode[ ] of proceeding.” Id. at 523–24.
109. Id. at 523.
110. Id. at 532. The Court noted that “the requirement of due process of law in judicial
procedure is not satisfied by the argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest
self-sacrifice could carry it on without danger of injustice.” Id.
111. Id. at 534. The Court’s articulation of this as a distinct rationale notwithstanding,
this “alternative” ground certainly might be interpreted as nothing more than an example
of what might lead the average man as judge “not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused.” Id. at 532.
112. Id. at 532–33; see also Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (finding a due process violation on the ground that an official perforce occupied two inconsistent positions).
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The Court’s Approach to Disqualification Shifted to an Emphasis
on Fundamental Principles

The Court abandoned its historical approach and relied on
broad principles of fairness and justice in In re Murchison.113 In that
case, the Court found a denial of due process when a Michigan judge
served as a one-man grand jury and subsequently tried, convicted, and
sentenced two men for criminal contempt based on their conduct
during the grand jury proceeding.114 The Court explained judicial
disqualification under the Due Process Clause in terms of general
principles, rather than the historical inquiry undertaken in Tumey.115
Due process, the Court explained, requires “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal,” a requirement that entails an absence of actual bias.116 Yet,
the Court continued, “our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”117 Thus, the Tumey holding,
according to the Court, “may sometimes bar trial by judges who have
no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of
justice equally between contending parties,”118 an appropriate outcome because “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”119 The
Court ultimately held that, having participated in the accusatory process, “a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused.”120
113. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
114. Id. at 134–35, 139.
115. Compare id. at 136–38 (discussing fairness and practicality concerns), with supra
notes 99–110 and accompanying text (describing the historical inquiry undertaken by the
Tumey Court).
116. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. The Court followed this approach in Ungar v.
Sarafite, where it determined that the judge in question need not be disqualified because
the Court could not “say there was bias, or such a likelihood of bias or an appearance of
bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the
court and the interests of the accused.” 376 U.S. 575, 588 (1964); see also Peters v. Kiff, 407
U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (“[D]ue process is denied by circumstances that create the likelihood
or the appearance of bias.”).
117. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
118. Id.
119. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11, 14 (1954)). Citing the maxim that no man should be a judge in his own case or where
he has an interest in the outcome, the Court explained that the nature of the interest
“cannot be defined with precision.” Id. Instead, the Court explained, “[c]ircumstances
and relationships must be considered.” Id.
Offutt involved the issue of federal judges’ power to punish contempt. 348 U.S. at 13.
The Court decided the case pursuant to its authority to supervise the federal courts, id.,
and held that the trial judge in question should have disqualified himself because he “permitted himself to become personally embroiled with the petitioner” and therefore did not
represent the “impersonal authority of law,” id. at 17.
120. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137. The Court also noted a potential denial of the
defendants’ fundamental right to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Id. at 139.
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Sixteen years later, the Court in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania121 similarly focused its analysis on principles of fairness when it disqualified a
judge from sentencing a defendant who had verbally abused the judge
throughout the trial.122 The Court held that “a defendant in criminal
contempt proceedings should be given a public trial before a judge
other than the one reviled by the contemnor.”123
The Court expanded its disqualification jurisprudence in Gibson
v. Berryhill,124 in which it explained that a judge’s pecuniary interest in
the litigation did not need to be as “direct or positive” as the interest
in Tumey.125 It thus affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the
Alabama Board of Optometry was disqualified from deciding the question of an optometrist’s unprofessional conduct, since “success in the
Board’s efforts would possibly redound to the personal benefit of
members of the Board.”126
Two years later, in Withrow v. Larkin127 the Court explored the
question of judicial bias and reiterated the presumption against it. In
Withrow, the Court addressed whether a state medical examining
board could suspend a doctor’s medical license on charges stemming
from its own investigation.128 Although the case involved an administrative agency, the Court discussed the general principles inherent in
the due process right to a fair trial.129 The Court explained its jurisprudence as a history of identifying various situations “in which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the
judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.”130
But the Court also explained that state administrators are assumed to
be impartial and objective, and thus “‘capable of judging a particular
controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances.’”131 In addition to this presumption of honesty and integrity, the Court explained, due process analysis incorporates “a realistic appraisal of
121. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
122. See id. at 464–66 (“Whether the trial be federal or state, the concern of due process
is with the fair administration of justice.”).
123. Id. at 465–66 (“No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.”).
124. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
125. Id. at 579. This expansion was also a reversion to the stricter common-law approach seemingly ignored by the Tumey holding. See supra text accompanying notes
105–08.
126. Gibson, 411 U.S at 578.
127. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
128. Id. at 46.
129. See id. at 46–47 (discussing the dangers of having a biased decisionmaker).
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 55 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)); see also supra
notes 96, 98.
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psychological tendencies and human weakness.”132 Although the
Court ultimately found no per se due process violation, it allowed that
its holding did not preclude courts in other cases from determining
that, given the specific facts and circumstances at issue, the risk of
unfairness was intolerably high.133
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,134 the Court clarified the Gibson Court’s expansion of Tumey.135 In Lavoie, an Alabama Supreme
Court justice refused to disqualify himself from hearing an appeal in a
case involving an insurance company’s allegedly tortious behavior
when he had two pending actions against insurance companies.136
The Court held that the justice’s “general hostility towards insurance
companies that were dilatory in paying claims” did not engender a
due process violation, although it did find a denial of due process in
the justice’s direct stake in the case’s outcome.137 It explained that,
traditionally, judges were not disqualified for bias or prejudice, although there had been a recent trend toward statutory provisions that
permit such disqualification—a trend that was not sufficient for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause,
since state decisions about legal procedures are discretionary and may
only be proscribed by the Due Process Clause when they “offend[ ]
some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”138 In so holding, the
Court explicitly declined to decide whether allegations of bias or
prejudice could be sufficient under the Due Process Clause, although
it offered dictum that such disqualification would only ever be constitutionally required “in the most extreme of cases.”139 Addressing the
appellant’s contention that the other justices should have disqualified
themselves as well, the Court explained the “direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary” test as a spectrum: “At some point, [t]he biasing
132. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.
133. Id. at 58. The Court also noted that findings “made by judges with special insights
into local realities are entitled to respect.” Id.
134. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
135. See supra text accompanying notes 124–25.
136. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 817–18.
137. Id. at 820–21, 824. The Court found a denial of due process because the Alabama
Supreme Court decision was binding on all lower courts, including the one in which the
justice’s cases were pending. Id. at 822. The justice thus “acted as a judge in his own case.”
Id. at 824 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court stressed that its
holding did not address whether the justice was biased or influenced in fact, but simply
that sitting on the case would possibly tempt the average judge “‘not to hold the balance
nice, clear and true.’” Id. at 825 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927)).
138. Id. at 821 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)).
139. Id.
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influence . . . [will be] too remote and insubstantial to violate the
constitutional constraints.”140 Finally, the Court noted that the Due
Process Clause merely establishes the baseline for judicial disqualifications and that “Congress and the states . . . remain free to impose
more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification.”141
Congress, in fact, did so by requiring the disqualification of a federal judge “in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,”142 as well as in five specifically enumerated
situations.143 In Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,144 a party moved to disqualify Justice Scalia under this statute,
questioning the appearance of his impartiality.145 In denying the motion,146 Justice Scalia explained that “[t]he people must have confidence in the integrity of the Justices, and that cannot exist in a system
that assumes them to be corruptible by the slightest friendship or
favor, and in an atmosphere where the press will be eager to find footfaults.”147
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,148 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that
the “serious, objective risk of actual bias” required Justice Benjamin’s
disqualification because Blankenship, the chairman, chief executive
officer, and president of Massey, “had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.”149 Writing for
the majority, Justice Kennedy opened by explaining that most matters
140. Id. at 826 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980)).
141. Id. at 828; see also Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997) (noting that due
process questions are, “in most cases, answered by common law, statute, or the professional
standards of the bench and bar”).
142. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). This standard does not depend upon “the reality of bias
or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).
143. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (listing circumstances under which a judge shall disqualify
himself). This standard requires disqualification because of relationships that are even
more distant than in-law status, id. § 455(b)(5), which directly contrasts with the strict common-law rule, see Brookes v. Earl of Rivers, (1668) 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex.) (refusing to
disqualify a judge who was brother-in-law to one of the parties).
144. 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
145. See id. at 913–16 (addressing whether Justice Scalia should recuse himself because
he went duck hunting in a group that included then-Vice President Cheney).
146. Id. at 929.
147. Id. at 928.
148. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
149. Id. at 2264–65.
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relating to judicial disqualification do not implicate constitutional
protections.150 Rather, the Due Process Clause incorporates the common-law rule that required disqualification when the judge had “a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in the case.151 The
Court explained that this common-law rule reflects the principle that
“[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause.”152
According to the majority, however, new problems have emerged
that were not dealt with at common law.153 The majority, therefore,
went on to discuss two such situations where the Court has found the
probability of bias to be constitutionally impermissible.154 The Court
first considered judges who have a financial interest in the outcome of
a case, but whose interest, it explained, is not great enough to have
been considered personal or direct at common law.155 The Court
then considered judges who, rather than a pecuniary interest, have a
conflict arising from their role in a previous proceeding.156 From its
discussion of precedent, the majority emphasized that due process requires disqualification when there is a “general concept of interests
that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”157 The constitutional
yardstick, the majority elaborated, is not whether the judge was, in
fact, influenced.158 Instead, the question is whether sitting on the
case “would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . .
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.”159 Thus, according to the majority, the test is an objective one and does not inquire into subjective bias, although the requisite interest for judicial
disqualification “cannot be defined with precision.”160
150. Id. at 2259.
151. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927)).
152. Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2259–60.
156. Id. at 2261.
157. Id. at 2260.
158. Id. at 2261.
159. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)). The Court later offered two alternative, if
circular, articulations. First, “whether the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias.” Id. at 2262 (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, “whether, ‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological
tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.’” Id. at 2263 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)).
160. Id. at 2261 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133, 136 (1955)).
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The majority then turned to the present case, which, it explained,
presented novel facts because the Court had never previously dealt
with the question of disqualification in the context of judicial elections.161 Disclaiming that it did not decide whether there was bias in
fact,162 the Court concluded that there is a serious risk of actual bias
“when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case
by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the
case was pending or imminent.”163 In making this assessment, the
Court considered “the contribution’s relative size in comparison to
the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total
amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election”164 and found that Blankenship’s contributions indeed had a disproportionate influence on the
election’s outcome.165 Similarly, the Court explained that a critical
factor is the temporal relationship between the campaign contributions, the pendency of the case, and the judge’s election because, just
as no man should judge his own cause, no man should be permitted
to pick his own judge—at least without the other parties’ consent.166
Finally, the Court emphasized that the present case involved an
“extraordinary situation.”167 Because states adopt judicial regulations
that are stricter than what is constitutionally necessary, the majority
predicted that most disqualification disputes would not even touch
upon constitutional considerations.168 Thus, the majority explained,
there need not be any fear of adverse consequences arising out of the
Court’s holding that Justice Benjamin’s failure to disqualify himself
raised constitutional issues.169
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion, which was
joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.170 The dissent criticized
two facets of the majority opinion. First, emphasizing that the Court
has only ever identified two situations in which a judge’s failure to
161. Id. at 2262.
162. Id. at 2263.
163. Id. at 2263–64.
164. Id. at 2264. The Court later explained that whether the contributions were necessary and sufficient to the judge’s victory is irrelevant, since a causal determination is as
difficult an inquiry as whether a judge was actually biased. Id. Nevertheless, the Court did
find such a causal connection. See infra text accompanying note 165.
165. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264.
166. Id. at 2264–65.
167. Id. at 2265.
168. Id. at 2267.
169. Id. at 2265–66.
170. Id. at 2267 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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disqualify himself implicates constitutional principles,171 Chief Justice
Roberts asserted that, as a general rule, judicial disqualification is to
be regulated by the common law, statutes, and judicial and bar regulations.172 Thus, he objected, the majority was unnecessarily invoking
the Constitution.173
Second, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the standard adopted by
the majority as vague, explaining that it provides no guidance to
courts and litigants.174 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the test
articulated by the majority will—despite the majority’s disclaimer—
lead to adverse consequences, such as an increased number of disqualification motions and a corresponding increase in due process
challenges.175 In short, Chief Justice Roberts argued that “opening
the door to recusal claims under the Due Process Clause, for an amorphous ‘probability of bias,’ will itself bring our judicial system into undeserved disrepute, and [will] diminish the confidence of the
American people in the fairness and integrity of their courts.”176
Justice Scalia wrote separately to emphasize the adverse consequences he believed would follow and to reproach the majority for
attempting to “right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through
the Constitution.”177 According to Justice Scalia, the Court was doing
more harm than good by ambiguously expanding a constitutional protection to address imperfections in the judicial system, such as the one
on display in the present case.178
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause required Justice Benjamin’s disqualification
because Blankenship had “a significant and disproportionate influence” in placing Justice Benjamin on a case in which Blankenship had
a personal stake.179 To reach this result, the Court mischaracterized
171. Id. at 2268 (describing the two situations discussed by the majority).
172. Id.
173. See id. at 2267 (criticizing the majority for using the Due Process Clause to overturn
Justice Benjamin’s failure to recuse himself).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2272–74.
176. Id. at 2274. Chief Justice Roberts further suggested that the present case was not as
unique as the majority believed. Id. at 2273. He also criticized the majority’s characterization of Blankenship’s independent expenditures as campaign contributions, given that Justice Benjamin could not control the funds’ use, and they might as easily have hurt Justice
Benjamin’s campaign as helped it. Id.
177. Id. at 2274–75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2275.
179. Id. at 2263–64 (majority opinion).
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its precedent and articulated a disqualification jurisprudence that
failed to account for the general development of its due process jurisprudence.180 By doing this, the Court empowered itself to invoke the
Constitution and thereby disqualify Justice Benjamin.181 Of course,
the Court could have disqualified Justice Benjamin through a correct
application of its precedent,182 but a correct application of precedent
would have also made clear that the Due Process Clause did not mandate a particular disposition.183 Had the Court recognized this, it
could have given greater weight to other issues implicated by the
case—issues that should have prompted the Court to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.184
A. The Court Failed to Account for a Fundamental Methodological Shift
in Its Approach to Due Process
The right to due process today is very different from its original
conception.185 In contrast to today’s broad, principle-based doctrine,
many commentators accept that the English tradition from which the
concept of due process arose was narrow and technical—and this is
true regardless of whether one traces the Due Process Clause to
Magna Carta like the Court did in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co.186 or whether one traces it specifically to the English
statute enacted in 1354 that first used the phrase “due Process of the
Law.”187 But even as it adopted Magna Carta as ancestor to the Due
Process Clause, the Court began broadening the doctrine; where
180. See infra Part IV.A–B.
181. See infra notes 332–39 and accompanying text.
182. See infra Part IV.C.1.
183. See infra Part IV.C.2. Thus, under existing precedent, Justice Benjamin’s failure to
disqualify himself was not a priori a denial of due process.
184. See infra Part IV.C.3.
185. See supra Part II.A.
186. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855); see supra text accompanying notes 43–48.
187. 1354, 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (Eng.); see Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1911) (tracing the phrase “due process of
law” to Chapter 3 of 28 Edw. III and explaining that it refers to “the indictment or presentment of good and lawful men . . . or by writ original of the common law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jurow, supra note 42, at 266–70, 277–79 (explaining that the terms
“due process of law” and “process” were consistently used to refer precisely to a particular
method of summoning a person to appear and answer accusations). Corwin, among
others, traced this statute to Magna Carta. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 28 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[Sir Edward] Coke equated the phrase ‘due
process of the law’ in the 1354 statute with the phrase ‘Law of the Land’ in Chapter 29 of
Magna Charta . . . .”); Corwin, supra.
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Magna Carta only bound the king,188 the Court in Murray’s Lessee explicitly disclaimed any such limitation on the Due Process Clause.189
The Court has since applied the Due Process Clause to all three governmental branches.190
In keeping with the original, technical understanding of Magna
Carta, some early commentators explicated the American concept of
due process as only applying in criminal trials,191 and indeed, most of
the Court’s early due process cases involved individuals opposing the
state qua state.192 By the time of Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,193
188. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 96 (“The
Magna Carta bound the King and the 1354 statute the judges. Parliament was
unfettered.”).
189. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 276 (“The article is a restraint on the legislative
as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.”).
190. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (legislature); Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936) (police); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judges).
191. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 353–54 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Company 1868) (approving the following definition of due process:
“By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law, which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.”); 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 567 (5th ed.
1994) (“So that this clause in effect affirms the right of trial according to the process and
proceedings of the common law.”). But see Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 553 (1884)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (approving an early understanding of due process that embraced
both civil and criminal cases).
192. E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 624–25 (1887) (indictment for violating a
statute prohibiting manufacture and sale of liquor); Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 518 (statement of
facts) (trial for murder); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 114–18 (1876) (criminal prosecution for serving as public warehousemen without a license); Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18
How.) at 274–76 (validity of distress warrant issued by a solicitor of the treasury). The
Court’s disqualification jurisprudence certainly developed in this category, and the Court
suggested this limitation in Tumey when it explained that procedures violate due process if
they might lead the judge “not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State and
the accused.” 273 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added).
Not all of the Court’s early cases were predicated on criminal trials. See, e.g., Kennard
v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480, 481–82 (1875) (dealing with the claim that a state
court denied due process in adjudicating between two holders of the same governmental
office). Yet Kennard is a far cry from more recent civil cases implicating the Due Process
Clause because the issue in Kennard arose from positive state action, rather than asserted
court impropriety. The Court was thus able to characterize the case as an instance of
individual versus state:
The sole question presented . . . is, whether the State of Louisiana, acting under the
statute of Jan. 15, 1873, through her judiciary, has deprived Kennard of his office
without due process of law . . . . The question before us is, not whether the courts
below, having jurisdiction of the case and the parties, have followed the law, but
whether the law, if followed, would have furnished Kennard the protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id. at 481 (emphasis added).
193. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
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however, the Court was applying due process considerations to suits
between two private parties.194
Whatever the specifics of its original contours, however, the expansion of the Due Process Clause’s scope from merely those “settled
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statue
[sic] law of England”195 to broad considerations of fairness196 represents a fundamental shift in the Court’s approach to due process, not
a mere case-by-case extension of existing rules.197 The Court did, of
course, discuss these principles in Caperton, but it attempted to situate
them within the historical inquiry of “new problems . . . that were not
discussed at common law”—problems that the Court has identified as
“instances which, as an objective matter, require recusal.”198 By
couching its due process jurisprudence as an application of existing
rules to new situations, the Court failed to ground itself adequately in
the fundamental principle upon which its understanding of the Due
Process Clause now rests—the right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.199
194. See id. at 815 (suit between insurer and insured); see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,
446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and
disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”).
195. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 277.
196. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (explaining that due process
requires “[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal”); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)
(suggesting that due process is that which is required by a “fair and enlightened system of
justice”), overruled on other grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
197. Justice Scalia articulated this in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip:
By [1934], [the Court’s] understanding of due process had shifted in a subtle but
significant way. . . . [D]ue process required “fundamental justice” or “fairness” in
all cases, and not merely when evaluating nontraditional procedures. . . .
In the ensuing decades, however, the concept of “fundamental fairness”
under the Fourteenth Amendment became increasingly decoupled from the
traditional historical approach. . . .
....
. . . [O]ur due process opinions in recent decades have indiscriminately applied balancing analysis to determine “fundamental fairness,” without regard to
whether the procedure under challenge was (1) a traditional one and, if so, (2)
prohibited by the Bill of Rights.
499 U.S. 1, 33–36 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted). This shift first manifested in Hurtado when the Court explicitly rejected the strict historical approach apparently mandated by Murray’s Lessee in order to limit the scope of the Due Process Clause. See
Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528–29 (majority opinion) (“[A] process of law . . . must be taken to
be due process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and in
this country; but it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process of law.” (emphasis
added)).
198. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2259 (2009).
199. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text. Of course, the Court in Withrow v.
Larkin explained its disqualification jurisprudence as a history of identifying situations “in
which experience teaches that the probability of actual bias” is unconstitutionally high.
421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). One way to read the Court’s statement is as an assertion that the
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The Court’s Discussion of Disqualification Principles Failed to
Account for the Development of Its General Due Process
Jurisprudence

In order to “place the present case in proper context,” the Court
discussed two situations “not discussed at common law” where the
Court has required disqualification.200 The implication, of course, is
that these situations were those where the Court has expanded its disqualification jurisprudence.201 But by taking this approach, the Court
misconstrued its precedent and skewed its discussion of
disqualification.202
1. Tumey v. Ohio and Its Progeny: The Court’s Misconstruction of
the First Situation “Not Discussed at Common Law”
The first situation that the Court addressed was that in which the
judge’s financial interest in the outcome of the case “was less than
what would have been considered personal or direct at common
law.”203 In this regard, the Court invoked Tumey v. Ohio204 and its
progeny.205 The Court’s discussion, however, inverted Tumey’s relationship to the common-law tradition.206
The Court asserted that “[t]he [Tumey] Court was . . . concerned
with more than the traditional common-law prohibition on direct pecuniary interest.”207 Instead, it reasoned, the Tumey Court was “concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt
adjudicators to disregard neutrality.”208 But that was not, in fact, the
case—or at least in the way the Court intended. The Court asserted
that the Tumey holding, which required disqualification for “direct,
personal, substantial, pecuniary” interests, was an adoption of the
common-law rule;209 accordingly, the Court’s discussion of “new
Court’s disqualification jurisprudence was, in fact, merely a common-law extension of existing rules, rather than a fundamental methodological shift.
200. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259.
201. See id. at 2260 (“The Court was thus concerned with more than the traditional
common-law prohibition on direct pecuniary interest.”).
202. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
203. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
204. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
205. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2259–61. The Court also invoked, in the following order, the
cases of Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1973), and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra notes 218–29 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
207. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2259.
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problems . . . not discussed at common law” included one in which “a
judge had a financial interest in the outcome of the case” that was
“less than what would have been considered personal or direct at common law.”210 But as Tumey itself makes clear, the common-law rule
was that “the slightest pecuniary interest of any officer, judicial or
quasi-judicial, in the resolving of the subject matter which he was to
decide, rendered the decision voidable.”211 It was only in the Tumey
Court’s discussion of then-current American practices that it found
some divergence from the traditional approach, and it was this exception to the common-law rule that the Court adopted as its test for
when a judge should be disqualified because of interest.212 This was
the Tumey Court’s only departure from traditional common law, however; its second holding—that the mayor occupied two inconsistent
positions213—hearkened all the way back to Dr. Bonham’s Case214 and
City of London v. Wood.215 Moreover, the Court limited constitutional
disqualification to these two instances, expressly disclaiming disqualification in “matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, [and] remoteness of interest.”216 The Court’s use of Tumey to extend traditional
disqualification principles thus rests on infirm ground because that
case only involved one instance of divergence from the common-law
approach, namely where the Court adopted an exception to the common-law rule in order to limit disqualification, not extend it.217
This inversion holds true for the Court’s use of Ward v. Village of
Monroeville,218 Gibson v. Berryhill,219 and Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie.220 In Ward, the Court explored the Tumey Court’s requirement of
a direct, personal, and substantial pecuniary interest,221 but it ulti210. Id. at 2259–60. If, as the Court explained, Tumey adopted the common-law rule,
then the inclusion of the Tumey line of cases in the set of situations “not discussed at common law,” id. at 2259, is problematic. Of course, the Caperton Court did not explicitly
endorse Tumey’s analysis of common law as correct, but that is the implication of its introduction of Tumey as “[t]he early and leading case on the subject.” Id.
211. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 524 (1927) (citing Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77
Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.)). The Court continued, “And this strict principle, unless there is
relief by the statute, is seen in modern cases.” Id. at 526.
212. See supra notes 99–110 and accompanying text.
213. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 534.
214. (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B.); see supra note 89.
215. (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (K.B.); see supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
216. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (explaining that such matters are those for legislative
discretion).
217. See supra notes 209–12 and accompanying text.
218. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
219. 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
220. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
221. Ward, 409 U.S. at 59–60.
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mately grounded its holding in the second of Tumey’s holdings—the
one that found problematic a situation where “an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously inconsistent positions.”222 The
Court’s statement in Gibson that “the financial stake need not be as
direct or positive as it appeared to be in Tumey,”223 a statement that
the Caperton majority cited to support its reading of the case law,224
did not expand the Court’s disqualification jurisprudence. Instead, it
simply provides a reading of Tumey that better accords with the strict
common-law rule.225 The Lavoie Court followed this approach, but by
requiring only the disqualification of the justice with pending litigation and not the rest of the justices who were class members in a class
action suit, the Court reaffirmed the line drawn by Tumey’s departure
from the strict common-law approach.226 In short, none of these
cases—from Tumey to Lavoie—expanded disqualification requirements
from the common-law rule.
Instead, these cases reflect the methodological shift that the
Court’s due process analysis has undergone.227 The Caperton Court’s
reading of Tumey as “concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality”228 was correct, but
not because of Tumey’s relationship to disqualification jurisprudence,
as the Court implied. This is a subtle but important point: Understanding Tumey and its progeny in light of the Court’s general due
process jurisprudence reorients Caperton away from the syllogistic implications of the Court’s reading of precedent and toward a flexible
baseline of fundamental fairness that permits more than one
disposition.229

222. Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
534 (1927)).
223. Gibson, 411 U.S. at 579.
224. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2260 (2009) (discussing
Gibson and that Court’s interpretation of Ward).
225. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common-law
rule.
226. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824–27 (1986). The Court made this
explicit when it held that the disqualified justice “acted as ‘a judge in his own case,’” id. at
824 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1995)), and had a “‘direct, personal,
substantial, [and] pecuniary’” interest, id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ward, 409 U.S.
at 60).
227. See supra Part IV.A.
228. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
229. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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2. In re Murchison and Mayberry v. Pennsylvania: The Court’s
Misconstruction of the Second Situation “Not Discussed at
Common Law”
The Court again failed to track the development of its general
due process jurisprudence when it examined “[t]he second instance
requiring recusal that was not discussed at common law”—namely
when a judge “was challenged because of a conflict arising from his
participation in an earlier proceeding.”230
In this context, the Court invoked In re Murchison231 and Mayberry
v. Pennsylvania.232 In re Murchison, however, only diverged from traditional principles in its reasoning—not its result. After all, the In re
Murchison holding has close common-law antecedents.233 It thus represents not a new situation, but a new approach to a familiar one.234
The reason that “prosecuting judges [should not] be trial judges of
the charges they prefer” is that “[f]air trials are too important a part of
our free society.”235 It was this approach that the Court followed in
Mayberry when grounding its holding in “the concern of due process . . . with the fair administration of justice.”236 The Court’s empha230. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2261.
231. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
232. 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
233. This can be brought out by a comparison of In re Murchison and two of the early
English cases. The In re Murchison Court set forth the following line of reasoning:
It would be very strange if our system of law permitted a judge to act as a grand
jury and then try the very persons accused as a result of his investigations. . . . A
single “judge-grand jury” is even more a part of the accusatory process than an
ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of that process a judge cannot
be . . . wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those accused. . . . [I]t
can certainly not be said that he would have none of [a prosecutor’s] zeal. Fair
trials are too important a part of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial
judges of the charges they prefer.
349 U.S. at 137.
Similarly, in Dr. Bonham’s Case, the court stated that “[t]he censors cannot be . . .
judges, ministers, and parties; judges to give sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture . . . ; and one cannot be Judge and
attorney for any of the parties.” (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.) (citations omitted).
The In re Murchison Court’s reasoning is aligned even closer to the reasoning in City of
London v. Wood, however:
[I]t is against all laws that the same person should be party and Judge in the same
cause, for it is manifest contradiction; . . . the party endeavours to have his will,
the Judge determines against the will of the party, and has authority to enforce
him to obey his sentence: and can any man act against his own will, or enforce
himself to obey?
(1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1602 (K.B.).
234. See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.
235. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137.
236. Mayberry, 400 U.S. at 465.
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sis on broad due process concerns ensured the relevance of its
assertion that “[n]o one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that
calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.”237 In this regard,
Mayberry does depart from the common-law disqualification doctrine,
for it is difficult to find the issue of fair adjudication in Brookes v. Earl
of Rivers,238 where the court refused to disqualify a judge whose
brother-in-law was one of the parties.239 But recognizing that the
Court’s disqualification jurisprudence has developed over time requires an understanding of how and why it did so, and it is this aspect
of the analysis that the Court ignored by treating In re Murchison and
Mayberry (as well as Tumey and its progeny) as mere common-law extensions of existing rules.240
C. The Court Should Have Considered Other Salient Factors Because Its
Jurisprudence Did Not Mandate a Particular Disposition
Although the Caperton Court’s failure to account for its general
due process jurisprudence skewed its discussion of disqualification
case law, it could have nonetheless reached the same result through a
correct application of precedent.241 Of course, a correct application
of the precedent would also have made manifest that principles of due
process did not mandate a particular result.242 Instead, a correct application of its precedent would have allowed the Court to weigh
other salient considerations, which ultimately should have tipped the
balance in favor of affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia.243
1. The Court Could Have Reached the Same Result by Properly
Applying Its Precedent
Over time, the Court’s due process jurisprudence increasingly
emphasized broad notions of fairness.244 The basic question in a due
process inquiry into judicial disqualification is therefore the basic
question of fairness and impartiality.245 This is to be expected be237. Id.
238. (1668) 145 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex.).
239. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying note 229.
241. See infra Part IV.C.1.
242. See infra Part IV.C.2.
243. See infra Part IV.C.3.
244. See supra Part II.A.
245. See supra Part II.B; cf. David C. Gray, Why Justice Scalia Should Be a Constitutional
Comparativist . . . Sometimes, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251, 1265 (2007) (explaining that even
a constitutional originalist can find contemporary meaning in the Eighth Amendment’s
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cause the fairness and impartiality of a tribunal implicates its ability to
function,246 as well as its role in democracy.247 Accordingly, maintaining public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary remains a
fundamental concern.248
The implication of this basic due process criterion for disqualification is that the Court could have disqualified Justice Benjamin even
if it had applied its precedent correctly. As the Court explained in
Withrow v. Larkin,249 due process analysis requires “a realistic appraisal
of psychological tendencies and human weakness.”250 Even accepting
Chief Justice Roberts’s argument that “Justice Benjamin and his campaign had no control over how [Blankenship’s contributions to ASK]
w[ere] spent,”251 $2.5 million is a significant amount of money to donate to a political organization dedicated to a single candidate.252
Considering psychological tendencies does, in fact, raise the specter
of a constitutionally problematic probability of bias because the question becomes, not what proximately caused Justice Benjamin’s election, but what Justice Benjamin thought contributed to his election. It
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by reading it as a prohibition against
that which “actually is cruel and unusual”).
246. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 89, at 378 (“The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the sword or the purse, no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution
whatever.”).
247. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 536 (1884) (referring to judicial review of
governmental action as “the device of self-governing communities to protect the rights of
individuals and minorities, as well against the power of numbers, as against the violence of
public agents transcending the limits of lawful authority”).
248. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (“The legitimacy of the
Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship.”). Indeed, this concern has spawned a great deal of recent debate over the wisdom of
judicial elections and their various forms. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, The Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why it Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259,
1260 (2008) (“Like judicial independence, judicial accountability is not an end in itself. It
too serves other ends: To promote the rule of law, institutional responsibility, and public
confidence in the courts.”). Geyh further explains that the “perennial policy struggle is to
strike an optimal balance between judicial independence and accountability,” a balance
that would ensure enough judicial independence that judges decide cases “without fear or
favor,” but also ensures enough accountability that the judges do not “disregard the facts
or law to the detriment of the rule of law and public confidence in the courts.” Id.
249. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
250. Id. at 47.
251. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2273 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
252. See id. at 2257 (majority opinion) (noting that Blankenship’s donations to ASK accounted for approximately two-thirds of the total funds it received); Louis Henkin, Shelley
v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 479 (1962) (“While ‘feelings’
hardly decide constitutional cases, they may well reflect historical and social institutions
and attitudes not irrelevant to concepts which permeate the fourteenth amendment.”).
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is therefore suggestive that the complexity of the chain of causation
precludes any ability to rule out the effect of Blankenship’s contributions as proximate cause.253
Moreover, despite Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion that the complexity of the causal chain that led to Justice Benjamin’s election undermines any assertion that Blankenship chose the judge in his own
cause,254 the reason that Caperton moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin before Massey filed its petition of appeal255 was the long delay
between Massey’s notice of intent to appeal and its actual appeal.256
This delay was due in large part to technical difficulties in obtaining
the trial transcript, but it was also due to Massey’s repeated requests
for continuances.257 Whatever the causal relationship between Blankenship’s contributions and Justice Benjamin’s election, Massey’s large
number of requests belies Chief Justice Roberts’s assertion, at least
with respect to what it appears Massey was trying to do. This concomitance of appearances and a causal chain too complex to isolate Massey’s actual influence may very well be of higher constitutional
significance than either factor alone.258 Hitherto, the Court may not
have extended the requirements of the Due Process Clause to encompass the mere appearance of bias, but the importance of public confidence in the judiciary entails that such an extension would have a
historical pedigree.259 Accordingly, a proper application of due process precedent could have supported the Court’s holding.
Alternatively, the Court could have grounded its reasoning in the
traditional prohibition against judges hearing their own cases.260 After all, if the Court in Gibson could find sufficient interest to disqualify
the Alabama Board of Optometry in the possibility that the Board’s
decision would “redound to the personal benefit of members of the
253. Compare Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264 (“Blankenship’s campaign contributions . . .
had a significant and disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome.”), with id. at
2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is also far from clear that Blankenship’s expenditures
affected the outcome of this election.”).
254. Id. at 2274 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
255. See supra note 19.
256. E-mail from Larry V. Starcher, supra note 25.
257. Id.
258. In other words, appearances have greater weight when they are grounded in fact.
259. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text. But see James L. Gibson & Gregory
A. Caldeira, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and Judicial Impartiality: Can the Legitimacy
of Courts Be Rescued by Recusals? 22 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 1491289, 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491289 (reporting the results of an empirical study
and concluding that “whether the [campaign] contribution is likely to influence the outcome of the election has nothing to do with perceptions of impartiality and legitimacy”);
infra note 282.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 89, 99–110.
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Board,”261 perhaps Justice Benjamin’s interest in maintaining his judicial position through the next election is equally sufficient.262 How
persuasive this is, of course, remains an open question, since Justice
Benjamin’s twelve year term263 might mean that the biasing influence
is too remote. But the mere availability of such an argument illustrates the flexibility of a correct application of precedent.
2. The Due Process Clause Did Not Require a Particular Disposition
The fact that the Due Process Clause embodies the abstract principle of fairness, requiring only an impartial tribunal—even if that requirement encompasses more concrete indicia, such as the absence of
actual or any probability of bias—gives the Court room to have decided the case either way.264 The Court itself has recognized that
there is a point beyond which there is no fixed meaning.265 This does
not mean that the Court was unfettered by parameters,266 just that the
261. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973).
262. In other words, Justice Benjamin might very well be interested in maintaining the
goodwill of Blankenship so as to ensure continued financial contributions—or at least ensure that Blankenship does not expend considerable resources to elect somebody else. Cf.
Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1059, 1088 (1996) (“[A] litigant ought to make a passable case against a sitting
judge by asserting that the judge has a direct, personal interest in ruling in accordance
with his [campaign] promise because it is central to his reelection, his personal
employment.”).
263. See W. VA. CODE § 3-1-16 (2006) (establishing the term length for justices on the
supreme court of appeals).
264. See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 527, 527 (1982) (defining
legal practice generally as an “exercise in interpretation”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) (“[W]e should prefer to
see the other clauses of the Bill of Rights read as an affirmation of the special values they
embody rather than as statements of a finite rule of law . . . .”); James Boyd White, Thinking
About Our Language, 96 YALE L.J. 1960, 1973 (1987) (discussing the instability of language,
even those terms that people assume refer transparently to an underlying concept, and
explaining that “all of our language, not just certain terms within it, is in constant flux”); cf.
Gray, supra note 245, at 1265 (explaining that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment does not depend on what any given society thinks is
cruel and unusual, but what actually is cruel and unusual).
265. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169–70 (1952) (explaining that even the
most specific constitutional provisions, a category to which the Due Process Clause does
not belong, evoke sharp differences among judges and among a particular judge’s various
decisions).
266. See id. at 170 (explaining that, despite the vagueness of the contours of the Due
Process Clause, judges cannot ground their decisions in personal notions because they are
limited by “considerations . . . fused in the whole nature of our judicial process”); BENJAMIN
N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28 (1921) (explicating the judge’s function as “extract[ing] from the precedents the underlying principle” before “determin[ing]
the path or direction along which the principle is to move and develop”); Easterbrook,
supra note 188, at 92 (“The whole idea of having a written constitution is inconsistent with
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boundaries of the inquiry had not yet been defined precisely enough
to demand a particular disposition.
Caperton did not allege that Justice Benjamin had a “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in the case.267 Nor did he contend that Justice Benjamin occupied two mutually inconsistent roles as
in In re Murchison.268 Instead, Caperton’s motion—and the Court’s
ultimate opinion—relied upon the idea asserted in In re Murchison:
Avoid the probability of unfairness and satisfy the appearance of justice, even if this requires disqualification of a judge who is unbiased in
fact.269 But in Lavoie, the Court specifically rejected a claim that the
judge in question had a “general hostility” to one of the parties and
suggested that disqualification for bias would only be constitutionally
required in “the most extreme of cases.”270 Although the In re Murchison Court asserted that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,”
that statement was mere dictum: The Court’s holding was rooted in
the fact that the judge occupied inconsistent roles and was therefore
not impartial in fact.271 Accordingly, in Cheney v. U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia,272 Justice Scalia rejected the argument that “the
American public, as reflected in the nation’s newspaper editorials, has
unanimously concluded that there is an appearance of favoritism,
[and] any objective observer would be compelled to conclude that
Justice Scalia’s impartiality has been questioned.”273
constant revisions in interpretation . . . . Words are designed to control. We have a text
and must make sense of it even at some cost to today’s notions of moral philosophy.”).
267. See Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 331a–335a (arguing that there was an appearance of bias).
268. See supra text accompanying note 120.
269. In its first motion, Caperton argued that “a reasonable person, knowing all of the
relevant facts, would harbor doubts about Justice’s [sic] Benjamin’s ability to be impartial
and that disqualification is necessary in order to develop and maintain the public’s confidence in West Virginia’s judiciary.” Joint Appendix, supra note 9, at 335a. Likewise, the
Court held that “objective standards may also require recusal whether or not actual bias
exists or can be proved.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009).
270. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820–21 (1986). This suggests a reason
why Justice Kennedy scrupulously characterized the facts of Caperton as “extreme.” See
Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 (“The facts now before us are extreme by any measure.”).
271. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136–39 (1955) (explaining that the judge was
also acting as prosecutor and that the judge’s dual role implicated the defendants’ right to
cross-examine witnesses).
272. 541 U.S. 913 (2004).
273. Id. at 923 (internal quotation marks omitted). Part of Justice Scalia’s rationale was
that the editorials contained incorrect facts and legal principles. Id. at 922–24.
Another part of Justice Scalia’s rationale was that United States Supreme Court Justices should hesitate to disqualify themselves because of the potential adverse consequences, such as would occur if the now-eight member Court split evenly on a decision. Id.
at 915. The ability of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals justices to find replacements, in contrast, was evident when Justices Starcher and Maynard disqualified themselves
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Although Caperton asserted that a reasonable person would entertain doubts about Justice Benjamin’s impartiality, it is also possible
that a reasonable person, knowing all of the relevant facts, would not.
After all, even Justice Starcher, who called for Justice Benjamin’s disqualification and asserted that “big money should never be permitted
to buy, or be seen to buy, justice,”274 accepted that Blankenship’s contributions were less to elect Justice Benjamin than they were to oust
incumbent Justice McGraw.275 An objective observer might reasonably assume Justice Benjamin understood that Blankenship merely
wanted to oust the incumbent, which minimizes the likelihood of any
biasing gratitude harbored by Justice Benjamin toward
Blankenship.276
While the Court’s case law makes clear that actual bias is unacceptable,277 its concern about the probability of bias has always been
an evidentiary matter,278 and the mere appearance of bias has never
itself been a constitutional criterion for disqualification.279 The
on rehearing. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 264–65 (W. Va. 2008)
(listing the judges “sitting by temporary assignment” to replace the disqualified justices).
274. Voluntary Disqualification Order, supra note 25, at 8.
275. Justice Starcher explained the following:
I think it’s safe to say that Justice Benjamin was basically an unknown. I don’t
think Blankenship knew him. I think he just happened to be running on the
Republican ticket at a time when Blankenship was ready to spend a lot of money.
Despite what Benjamin may think, it wasn’t his popularity that elected him. It was
the beating that the big bucks on his behalf gave Justice McGraw. A lot of folks
say Benjamin didn’t get elected; McGraw got defeated.
E-mail from Larry V. Starcher, supra note 25; see also Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2274 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting) (“Blankenship has made large expenditures in connection with several
previous West Virginia elections, which undercuts any notion that his involvement in this
election was ‘intended to influence the outcome’ of particular pending litigation.”).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 248–53.
277. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (“[A] biased decisionmaker [is]
constitutionally unacceptable . . . .”); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971)
(holding that the defendant in criminal contempt proceedings was entitled to an unbiased
judge—one who was “not bearing the sting of [the defendant’s] slanderous remarks”); In
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (“Fairness of course requires an absence of actual
bias in the trial of cases.”).
278. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58 (explaining that while the present facts did not amount
to a per se due process violation, this did not “preclude a court from determining from the
special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is
intolerably high” (emphasis added)); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1965) (explaining
that most due process claims require a showing of actual prejudice, but the Court has
sometimes found due process violations without such a showing when the procedure “involves such a probability that prejudice will result”); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (noting
that the Tumey holding is so stringent as to possibly “bar trial by judges who have no actual
bias”).
279. E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824–25, 828 (1986) (couching its
decision in terms of “the appearance of justice” but nonetheless holding that the disqualified justice “acted as a judge in his own case” and had a “direct, personal, substantial, [and]
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Caperton majority thus reached its decision by characterizing the case
as disqualification for probability of bias (as evidence of actual bias),
and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent characterized the majority’s holding as imposing a constitutional requirement of disqualification for
the appearance of bias.280
Whatever other problems its absence engenders, the appearance of
impartiality is not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”281 if
there is impartiality in fact.282 Imposing a constitutional standard in
such a case would be equivalent to “import[ing] into the discussion
[the Court’s] own personal views of what would be wise, just and fit-

pecuniary” interest (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 865 n.12 (1988)
(noting the “constitutional dimensions” of the Court’s concern with the appearance of
justice in Lavoie); Proctor v. Warden, 435 U.S. 559, 560 (1978) (per curiam) (reversing the
denial of a habeas corpus petition because the lower court’s per curiam order “ha[d] nothing whatsoever to do with the petitioner’s case,” and explaining that even if the result was
ultimately just, it needed to appear to be just).
Although the Court in Peters v. Kiff explained that it “has held that due process is
denied by circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias,” 407 U.S.
493, 502 (1972), in explaining its decision, the Court noted both the appearance of bias
and the increased risk of bias, and none of the cases that the Court cited went any further,
see id. at 503–04 (“Illegal and unconstitutional jury selection procedures . . . create the
appearance of bias in the decision of individual cases, and they increase the risk of actual
bias as well.”).
280. Compare Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2263 (majority opinion) (“The difficulties of inquiring into actual bias . . . simply underscore the need for objective rules.”), with id. at 2267
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Vaguer notions of bias or the appearance of bias were never a
basis for disqualification, either at common law or under our constitutional precedents.”).
In other words, the question is whether a probability or appearance of bias is merely the
means of testing for actual bias, or whether they are constitutionally impermissible in their
own right, regardless of actual bias.
281. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); see supra text accompanying notes 70–71.
282. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 914, 924
(2004) (explaining that determining whether a judge’s impartiality can be reasonably
questioned depends on “the facts as they existed, and not as they were surmised or reported”). But see Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 594 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“For a civilization founded upon principles of ordered liberty to
survive and flourish, its members must share the conviction that they are governed equitably.”); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (noting that the importance of the
appearance of justice is “deeply rooted in the common law”); cf. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 555–56 (1979) (explaining that discrimination in the grand jury selection process
“impairs the confidence of the public in the administration of justice,” which in turn injures “law as an institution” and “the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
But even if the appearance of justice, with the attendant issue of institutional legitimacy, is of constitutional magnitude, that does not necessarily mean that those concerns
are embodied in the Due Process Clause. See supra note 59.
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ting rules . . . and confound[ing] them with constitutional
limitations.”283
Bearing in mind the presumption established in Withrow that
judges will be honest and impartial,284 the upshot of this is that even
had the Court properly applied its due process precedent, it need not
have required disqualification.
3. The Court Should Have Considered Other Relevant Issues
Implicated by the Case
Given that the Due Process Clause does not require a particular
disposition, the Court should have given greater weight to the other
issues implicated by the case.285 Some of these issues are particularly
salient to the ongoing judicial elections debate, such as the tension
between judicial accountability and judicial independence.286 But the
case also raises issues beyond those of judicial election policy—
namely, if the contribution is merely to elect someone from a particular political party, rather than a specific individual.287 If picking the
political party of one’s judge is the same thing as picking one’s
judge,288 what does this say about the constitutionality of partisan judicial elections?289
283. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 106–07 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
284. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
285. This, of course, begs the question as to why the Court should have considered
other factors if it could have reached the same result through a proper application of
precedent. But absent the Court’s ability to craft a clear standard within limits already
articulated by case law, it behooves the Court to carefully consider the implications of its
decision. See supra notes 264–66 and accompanying text; infra note 305 and accompanying
text. The most important issue implicated by the case is the ambiguity of its holding. See
infra notes 295–318 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 248. An expansion of the Court’s due process jurisprudence therefore comes at the expense of judicial accountability because if the two interests are mutually opposed, then the expansion of one must come at the expense of the other. Cf. Geyh,
supra note 248, at 1260 (describing the importance of judicial accountability as its ability to
prevent undesired “independence from decisional constraint, such as the freedom to decide cases for the benefit of friends or in exchange for bribes,” which is the very problem
raised in Caperton).
287. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
288. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009) (characterizing
the situation as a matter of Blankenship choosing his judge).
289. See Joe Cutler, Oops! I Said It Again: Judicial Codes of Conduct, the First Amendment, and
the Definition of Impartiality, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 733, 748–49 (2004) (arguing that the
“ethical dangers” arising from campaign funding derive from the transaction regardless of
the donor’s identity because “[f]inancial transactions create relationships”); Melinda Gann
Hall, Competition as Accountability in State Supreme Court Elections, in RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 165, 166 (Matthew
J. Streb ed., 2007) (explaining accountability as “a product of electoral competition,”
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Judicial disqualification also raises issues of cost, efficiency, and
fairness.290 Chief Justice Roberts’s fear that there will be a flood of
“Caperton motions” expresses this concern;291 indeed, there have already been a handful of such disqualification motions—and in at least
one such case, it has even been called a “Caperton claim.”292 Of
course, as Chief Justice Roberts noted, “[c]laims that have little
chance of success are nonetheless frequently filed,”293 so the clearer
standard he desires would not necessarily help, and rules of procedure usually include a mechanism for policing frivolous claims.294
As Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia argued, however, the
biggest problem with the Court’s decision is that its articulated standard provides too little guidance.295 The majority implicitly accepted
which ultimately “bring[s] the judiciary better in line with citizen preferences”); see also
Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the Supreme Court’s
decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), as suggesting that
“the standard for judicial elections should be the same as the standard for legislative and
executive elections”); Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections,
35 IND. L. REV. 659, 666 (2002) (explaining that the original purpose of judicial elections
was “to secure independence for the judiciary, to insulate the judiciary from partisan politics and control, to improve the judges’ performance and administration, and thus, to elevate the bench, the profession, and public confidence in the judicial system”). The Court
recently weighed in on this debate with its decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, in which it struck down a federal law limiting corporate independent expenditures.
130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
290. See Frank, supra note 89, at 608 (“[I]f disqualification of judges is too easy, both the
cost and the delay of justice go out of bounds. If disqualification is too hard, cases may be
decided quickly, but unfairly.”).
291. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2273 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I believe we will come to
regret this decision as well, when courts are forced to deal with a wide variety of Caperton
motions . . . .”).
292. See, e.g., Henry v. Jefferson County Comm’n, No. 3:06-CV-33, 2009 WL 2857819, at
*4 (N.D. Va. Sept. 2, 2009) (“Plaintiffs take the Supreme Court’s holding in Caperton and
stretches [sic] it to its extreme.”); Rhiel v. Hook (In re Johnson), 408 B.R. 123, 124, 127
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2009) (rejecting as inapposite a motion for disqualification based on
Caperton in a bankruptcy proceeding in which the judge in question had ruled adversely to
the defendant’s interest regarding a recovery of property); Marek v. State, 14 So. 3d 985,
989, 1000 (Fla. 2009) (affirming the post-conviction court’s denial of the defendant’s
“Caperton claim” when the ground for the motion was the post-conviction judge’s relationship with defense trial counsel), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 40 (2009).
293. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2272.
294. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (granting courts authority to impose sanctions if an
attorney improperly certifies that a pleading, written motion, or other paper is “not being
presented for any improper purpose,” “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions
therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law,” and the asserted
“factual contentions have evidentiary support”); W. VA. R. CIV. P. 11 (same).
295. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269–72 (raising forty potential issues that the majority’s
standard fails to address, with varying levels of persuasiveness); id. at 2274 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s decision will “create vast uncertainty”); supra note 164
(noting the Court’s contradictory stance on the relevance of a causal inquiry).
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this ambiguity when it articulated a test without fixed criteria,296
which makes sense given that there are compelling reasons as to why
such ambiguity might not be fatal. First, the Lavoie Court suggested
the conceptualization of disqualification as a spectrum,297 and the
Caperton facts are on the higher end of the spectrum.298 Even the supreme court of appeals, explaining its reversal of the jury award, asserted that “the facts of this case demonstrate that Massey’s conduct
warranted the type of judgment rendered in this case.”299 Second, the
Court’s emphasis on ensuring an objective disqualification rule is
both appropriate and proper because objective rules are easier to administer, and they ensure the disqualification of judges who are not
conscious of their biases.300 Finally, the Court has, in the past, articulated holdings whose boundaries were not entirely clear.301 Indeed,
the Court in Twining v. New Jersey,302 recognizing the “difficulties of
ascertaining [the] connotation [of the Due Process Clause],” noted
that the Court “has always declined to give a comprehensive definition
of [the Due Process Clause], and has preferred that its full meaning
should be gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclu-

296. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2264 (majority opinion) (“The inquiry centers on the
contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect such contribution
had on the outcome of the election.” (emphasis added)).
297. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text.
298. See Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 (explaining why this case presents an extreme factual situation); see also Arman McLeod, If at First You Don’t Succeed: A Critical Evaluation of
Judicial Selection Reform Efforts, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 499, 505–09 (2005) (describing studies
that found a link between campaign contributions and judicial decisions). As Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent noted, however, the majority’s blanket characterization of this case as
extreme does not provide any explanation of how to distinguish between “normal” and
“extreme” cases. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2269–74 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
299. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, slip op. at 13 (W. Va. Nov. 21, 2007).
300. See Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) (“Bias or prejudice is such
an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might exist in the mind of one . . . who was quite positive that he
had no bias . . . .”), superseded by statute, Act of Aug. 22, 1935, ch. 605, 49 Stat. 682 (changing
the requirements for jury service), as recognized in United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,
132–33 (1936); CARDOZO, supra note 266, at 167 (“Deep below consciousness are other
forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of
instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be
litigant or judge.”).
301. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (“We are not unmindful
that hypothetical situations can be conjured up, shading imperceptibly from the circumstances of this case and by gradations producing practical differences despite seemingly
logical extensions. But the Constitution is intended to preserve practical and substantial
rights, not to maintain theories.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
302. 211 U.S. 78 (1908), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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sion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise.”303 This is, in
fact, precisely what the Court did in Caperton, exercising its prerogative under Withrow.304
Yet the Court exercises its appellate jurisdiction in order to clarify
the law, not to ensure justice in a particular case.305 As Justice Cardozo wrote, “We must not sacrifice the general to the particular. We
must not throw to the winds the advantages of consistency and uniformity to do justice in the instance.”306 The Court articulated its
holding out of the need for objective standards,307 but an ambiguous
holding whose contours are undefined is as difficult to administer as a
subjective test would be.308
Of course, Justice Cardozo also wrote that “[e]very new case is an
experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a
result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.”309 But arguing that the Court can just clarify the holding in the next case ignores
the fact that only the Supreme Court can review state court judgments.310 For the Court to adopt such a distinctly common-law ap303. Id. at 100; see also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (explaining that, in
conducting a due process inquiry, the judiciary should not “ask where the line is once and
for all to be drawn” but should “recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the gradual
and empiric process of inclusion and exclusion” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
304. See supra text accompanying note 299; Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 (1975)
(“That the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more,
constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining
from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.”).
305. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law.”).
306. CARDOZO, supra note 266, at 103.
307. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009) (“The difficulties
of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one, simply
underscore the need for objective rules.”).
308. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291 (2004) (plurality opinion) (criticizing a
proposed gerrymandering standard that was “essentially a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis, where all conceivable factors, none of which is dispositive, are weighed with an eye
to ascertaining whether the particular gerrymander has gone too far”); U.S. Fid. Ins. &
Guar. Co. v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 773 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. 2009) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (calling the Caperton opinion “positively Delphic in explaining the standards for courts attempting to implement it” and discussing competing interpretations
espoused by various high-profile legal practitioners).
309. CARDOZO, supra note 266, at 23.
310. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544
U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (“[Section] 1257, as long interpreted, vests authority to review a state
court’s judgment solely in this Court”). The Caperton Court exercised its jurisdiction under
§ 1257(a). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22).
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proach to defining its disqualification jurisprudence,311 it must grant
certiorari a sufficient number of times to clarify the legal principle.312
If it does not, it must either leave the standard undefined or, alternatively, articulate a clear standard, which is the very approach it has
eschewed throughout its case law;313 contrariwise, if the Court fills its
docket with disqualification cases, an inefficient project,314 it risks establishing itself as the micromanager of state court rulings.315 And
this has never been the Court’s role.316
The problems inherent in promulgating an ambiguous standard
militate in favor of affirming the judgment of the supreme court of
appeals—not because Justice Benjamin should not have disqualified
himself, but because the risk was not worth the reward.317 As Justice
Cardozo wrote, “There can be no wisdom in the choice of a path unless we know where it will lead.”318

311. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
312. This is particularly important given the trend of increased campaign contributions
in judicial elections, as well as the increasing influence wielded by special interest groups.
See Geyh, supra note 248, at 1265–66 (describing the increase in the amount of money
spent in support of judicial candidates from 1990 to 2006 and noting the recent advent of
“big league interest group involvement”). It is worth noting that Justice McGraw’s campaign also raised a significant amount of money—over $1 million, exclusive of independent expenditures. See State of West Virginia, Campaign Financial Statement for Warren
R. McGraw in Relation to 2004 Election Year (on file with the Maryland Law Review).
313. E.g., Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265 (explaining its recusal cases as those where “extreme facts . . . created an unconstitutional probability of bias that ‘cannot be defined with
precision’” (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986))); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (refusing to draw the line regarding when a judge’s interest
in the outcome of a case requires disqualification and noting that the “interest cannot be
defined with precision”); cf. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (“The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution
but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
[is] protected.” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
314. Cf. Frank, supra note 89, at 608 (suggesting that there should be limits to “the cost
and the delay of justice”).
315. See Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III
Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 105 (1985) (explaining that the Court has articulated
prophylactic criminal procedural rules because of “the difficulty of detecting constitutional
violations on a case-by-case basis”).
316. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167 n.1 (2002) (“[The Court] must lay down
rules that can be followed in the innumerable cases we are unable to review . . . .”).
317. See SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE FOR STUDENTS OF THE
COMMON LAW 30 (London, MacMillan & Co. 1896) (“Many things are left alone by the
State, as it were under protest, and only because it is thought that interference would do
more harm than good.”).
318. CARDOZO, supra note 266, at 102; cf. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 468
(1971) (Burger, J., concurring) (“In every trial there is more at stake than just the interests
of the accused . . . .”).

R

R

R

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR304.txt

676

unknown

Seq: 40

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

28-MAY-10

13:44

[VOL. 69:637

Five additional factors highlight this point. First, although one
cited benefit of the Court’s holding is that it sends a clear signal to the
states to shore up their judicial regulations,319 the Court could have
sent the same message—if not quite as strongly—by granting certiorari and being scrupulously clear in its opinion that its affirmation of
the judgment was predicated entirely on its present unwillingness to
extend constitutional principles, not on its condonation of Justice
Benjamin’s decision.
Second, not only do “Congress and the states . . . remain free to
impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification,”320 but
they have, in fact, done so.321 The Court’s extension of due process
principles to Justice Benjamin’s refusal to disqualify himself was superfluous in that Justice Benjamin should have disqualified himself under
the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.322
Third, it is not clear that the background of the case was one that
required emergency intervention; while some commentators have criticized the legal system in West Virginia as a “Judicial Hellhole,”323
others defend the West Virginia legal system against such critiques.324
In fact, even Justice Starcher, a vocal critic of perceived attempts to
319. See, e.g., E-mail from Larry V. Starcher, supra note 25.
320. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828 (1986).
321. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” (emphasis added)); W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(e)(1)
(1993) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s
impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .” (emphasis added)).
322. See State ex rel. Brown v. Dietrick, 444 S.E.2d 47, 52 n.9 (W. Va. 1994) (quoting the
following with approval: “[D]isqualification focuses on whether an objective assessment of
the judge’s conduct produces a reasonable question about impartiality, . . . [which] appears to require disqualification not only when there is in fact impropriety, but also when
there is an appearance of impropriety” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lavoie,
475 U.S. at 821 (reiterating that the Court may only interfere with state procedural regulations when they offend some fundamental principle of justice). The Court noted this in its
opinion, but failed to recognize its impact on the analysis. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266–67 (2009) (explaining how states’ adoptions of stricter
standards than constitutionally required ensure that “most disputes over disqualification
will be resolved without resort to the Constitution”). Of course, there remains the unsettling possibility that the accountability of judges on a state’s highest court will thereby be
lessened without such extra-tribunal supervision, but that is a problem relevant to the judicial selection debate. See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
323. See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz et al., West Virginia as a Judicial Hellhole: Why Businesses
Fear Litigating in State Courts, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 757, 787 (2009) (describing an “aura of
impropriety throughout West Virginia’s civil justice system”); AMERICAN TORT REFORM
FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004 23–24 (2004), http://www.atra.org/reports/hell
holes/2004/hellholes2004.pdf (ranking West Virginia as the fourth worst jurisdiction and
the only “statewide Judicial Hellhole”).
324. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social
Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097, 1134–37 (2008) (characterizing
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buy justice,325 asserted that Blankenship’s apparent attempt to improperly influence the judiciary through campaign contributions was
unique.326
Fourth, it is not clear that recusal is an adequate remedy for perceptions of judicial partiality. In an empirical study in West Virginia
based on the Caperton facts, James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira
concluded that “[i]f a judge who accepts contributions is required to
withdraw from the case owing to public perceptions, then these data
suggest that judges who are simply offered such support should also
withdraw.”327 This conclusion implicates the Court’s focus on “the apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election”
and whether the contributor had a “significant and disproportionate
influence in placing the judge on the case.”328 Gibson and Caldeira
also found that “recusals can elevate judicial legitimacy, but . . . the
effect of recusals is not to restore the court/judge to the level of support that
exists when no conflict of interest is present.”329 On the contrary, Gibson
and Caldeira suggest that the adverse effect of these conflicts on perceptions of legitimacy and impartiality “is exacerbated when many
judges recuse and when recusals are commonplace, because citizens
draw larger and more general conclusions about the relationships between public office holders and donors.”330 This conclusion further
complicates the relationship between campaign contributions, perceptions of impartiality, and institutional legitimacy beyond any simple reliance on institutional legitimacy to justify the Court’s
holding.331
the critiques as “misleading and manipulative” and based on incomplete data and faulty
inferences).
325. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2007 W. Va. LEXIS 119, at *107
(W. Va. Nov. 21, 2007) (Starcher, J., dissenting) (“It has been amusing for me to see Mr.
Blankenship trying with all his might to create the circumstances where I would be forced
to step aside and let him have in toto the kind of Court he wants . . . .”).
326. Justice Starcher explained the following:
I don’t think most coal companies try to interfere . . . . Don Blankenship has
been somewhat unique. I’ve never known any individual by name to step out and
take a lead in spending that kind of money. We’ve never had the kind of direct
interference, with [one] exception . . . . Blankenship is unique in this respect.
E-mail from Larry V. Starcher, supra note 25.
327. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 259, at 24. This is because “[i]ndependent electoral
support, irrespective of the judge’s wishes, undermines institutional legitimacy to at least
some degree.” Id. at 19.
328. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263–64 (2009).
329. Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 259, at 32.
330. Id.
331. It is important to note, however, that this study cannot be generalized beyond the
context of West Virginia, id. at 17, and the Court should properly be skeptical of basing any
holding on such limited empirical evidence, see, e.g., Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30

R
R

R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-3\MLR304.txt

678

unknown

Seq: 42

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

28-MAY-10

13:44

[VOL. 69:637

Finally, although affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia may have appeared to be an unjust disposition,332 such a normative characterization confuses the issues at
stake. The West Virginia court’s decision was fully grounded in applicable legal principles.333 The only issue for the Court to decide was a
procedural question—a question about how the West Virginia court
arrived at its decision. Given that West Virginia’s Code of Judicial
Conduct regulates Justice Benjamin’s decision—and many other jurisdictions have similar requirements334—at stake is the federalism concern of who, if anyone, should supervise states’ highest courts.335
Judges of courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the same strict standard as the one adopted by West Virginia will face the same decision,
regardless of whether the Court can serve as a check on the decision.336 And given the ambiguity of the Caperton holding, state court
judges must interpret the standard before they can apply it—a process
that promises to create a feedback loop if the Court begins to grant
certiorari in order to constrain the state court interpretations.337 In
other words, state court judges must still exercise their discretion, a
discretion that the Court in Withrow asserted carries a presumption of

N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955) (referencing the Court’s controversial use of sociological
and psychological studies in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and noting
that behavioral science findings “have an uncertain expectancy of life”). But see Kenneth B.
Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist’s Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224, 235
(1959–1960) (“Of course there are dangers involved in the use of science in any area of
human activity. . . . But this is not new. Science has nonetheless continued its advance and
contributions to the ethical and material progress of mankind.”).
332. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 22.
333. See supra note 23. This is not the same thing as claiming that the court reached the
correct result on the merits. Yet it is noteworthy that, after the Supreme Court remanded
the case for further proceedings, the West Virginia court—this time without Justice Benjamin—again reversed the jury verdict, grounding its decision in the forum selection clause.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, slip op. at 1 (W. Va. Nov. 12, 2009).
334. As the Court acknowledged, “Almost every State—West Virginia included—has
adopted the American Bar Association’s objective standard: ‘A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.’” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct.
2252, 2266 (2009) (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2004)).
335. These are the same issues at stake in the judicial selection debate. See supra note
248.
336. See, e.g., Law v. United States, Civil No. 1:08CV171, Criminal No. 1:06CR20, 2009
WL 1884444, at *1–5 (N.D. W. Va. June 30, 2009) (interpreting the governing statute, case
law, motion to disqualify, and the facts before denying the motion), appeal dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction, No. 09-7288, 2009 WL 4506387 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2009).
337. See supra notes 308, 310–16 and accompanying text.
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integrity.338 Making Justice Benjamin’s decision a constitutional issue
simply empowered the Court to supervise that discretion.339
In short, where the Court’s due process jurisprudence did not
demand a particular disposition, these additional factors weigh
against applying the Due Process Clause to Justice Benjamin’s failure
to disqualify himself.
V. CONCLUSION
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court held that
Justice Benjamin’s refusal to disqualify himself amounted to a denial
of due process.340 In so holding, the Court conflated two separate
jurisprudences in order to disqualify Justice Benjamin because extending constitutional principles was the only way the Court could
have done so.341 Although the ultimate result is not inconsistent with
the Court’s prior jurisprudence,342 the Court should have weighed
other salient factors in its decision and affirmed the verdict of the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.343

338. See supra text accompanying notes 127–31.
339. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (establishing the scope of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction).
340. 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263–64 (2009).
341. See supra Part IV.A–B.
342. See supra Part IV.C.1–2.
343. See supra Part IV.C.3.
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